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Harry T. Edwards and Virginia A. Seitz
FROM LABOR LAW TO EMPLOYMENT LAW
What Next?
h en  P ro fe sso r  M c K e l v e y  and  P ro fesso r  
Neufeld first contacted us about contributing to 
this volume, they described the proposed publica­
tion as “a unique Festschrift which honors—not 
a beloved savant and teacher—but a beloved 
group of disciplines which were brought together 
in 1945 at the first institution of higher learning dedicated to research 
and teaching in the field of industrial and labor relations.” The tribute 
is well deserved, for the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at 
Cornell University has been and remains a truly great institution of 
scholarship and learning.
More than sixty years have passed since Congress enacted the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA),1 providing employees 
with “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor orga­
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”2 The ILR 
School was founded at Cornell as a direct consequence of this enact­
ment. Indeed, as Arnold Weber once observed, institutions like the 
ILR School were “perceived as signifying the coming of age of orga­
nized labor and as confirming its legitimacy in society.” 3 However, 
while the school has grown and flourished over the past five decades, 
the years have not been so kind to organized labor and collective bar­
gaining in the United States. It would be an overstatement to say that 
the union movement is facing demise or that collective bargaining has 
become irrelevant, but there are more than a handful of scholars and 
practitioners in the field who would argue (or concede) that this is not 
far from the truth.
The continued decline in American unionism and collective bar­
gaining—and the accompanying perception that unions and collective 
bargaining are fast becoming an irrelevance in modern industrial 
life—calls into question the original raison d’etre of schools of indus­
trial relations. This volume presents an appropriate opportunity, we 
think, to examine the roots of the present decline of organized labor, 
collective bargaining (and, arguably, labor law as well), and to specu­
late about their future relevance, if any, in modern industrial society. 
Coincidentally, we think that such an examination will serve to 
reaffirm the importance of the Cornell ILR School, albeit for reasons 
somewhat different than those perceived by the founders of the school.
At the outset, we should make clear our general view on collective 
bargaining and the labor laws designed to enhance it. To paraphrase 
Winston Churchill, we believe that collective bargaining is the worst 
form of government for the workplace except for all others. We, like 
many others who have considered the issue, must acknowledge the limi­
tations inherent in any system of collective bargaining and rue the occa­
sional abuses that have been associated with the union movement.
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Nonetheless, we worry that the decline of organized labor and collective 
bargaining is a source of real concern, because we believe that “the 
process of enlightened employee relations in this country has been inex­
tricable from the rise of the trade union movement,”4 and that “strong 
and effective institutions for worker representation are essential not only 
to a democratic society but also to the nations economic progress.” 5
Our primary focus in this essay is the role played by law in the de- 
' cline of organized labor and the role that might be played by law in its 
potential revitalization. Specifically, we are concerned about the effect 
of both (1) labor law, i.e., the NLRA, as amended, which is the federal 
labor law governing employees’ legal rights to organize and act collec­
tively, and (2) employment laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), the Occupational Safety and Flealth Act (OSHA), Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
which afford individual employees an assortment of legal rights in con­
nection with their employment. But in order to understand the role 
played by “labor law” and “employment laws” in the decline or the po­
tential improvement in the fortunes of the labor movement, develop­
ments in the laws governing employment relationships and employee 
rights must be placed in a larger context. That is our goal in this essay.
In the first section, we briefly discuss the evidence supporting the 
premise of this essay—that the influence of organized labor in the 
United States has significantly declined. In the second section, we ex­
plore the causes of this decline, including the significant role played by 
federal labor law, as an aid to understanding the necessary role that 
labor law reform might play in any revitalization of the labor move­
ment. In addition, we reject the notion that employment laws—which 
protect certain legal rights of individuals in the workplace—have con­
tributed significantly to organized labor’s decline or that they can fully 
replace organized labor as the protector of employees’ interests.
Finally, in the third section, we argue that our national goals—a 
high-skill, high-technology, high-value-added economy—will require
a joint commitment from government, business, and labor, and that 
employees cannot participate in this endeavor as equal partners with­
out effective representative institutions. Labor law in its present form 
often precludes labor unions from creating organizations that can ef­
fectively represent employees on the issues of central importance to 
their lives; some labor law reform is therefore critical to achievement 
of this goal. With or without labor law reform, however, it is our view 
that labor unions must adjust their methods and priorities in order to 
more effectively serve the needs of workers. If nothing else, the past 
fifty years have shown that “ law” alone will not ensure effective collec­
tive bargaining or employment relationships.
The Decline of Organized Labor
While it is possible to overstate the influence of law on the decline of 
organized labor and on the substantive protections actually afforded 
to unrepresented employees, it would be difficult to exaggerate the 
dramatic effect that the decline of organized labor and the explosion 
of federal statutes affecting individual rights in the workplace have 
had on practice and teaching in these areas.
Within the curricula of law schools, for example, the teaching of 
labor law has gradually been eclipsed by employment law. In the 
1960s, the basic labor law course, covering the NLRA and focusing ex­
clusively on the private sector, was the centerpiece of the labor law 
package. This package sometimes included a seminar addressing col­
lective bargaining in the public sector, and, occasionally, a seminar of­
fering modest coverage of employment discrimination laws. By the 
1970s, the labor law package had expanded; the basic labor law course 
was joined by full course offerings in labor relations law in the public 
sector and in Title VII and other employment discrimination laws, by 
sophisticated courses in collective bargaining, and by a variety of 
seminars in employment-related subjects, such as sex discrimination, 
employment for people with disabilities, employment problems in 
higher education, and arbitration. In the 1980s, the menu of labor and 
employment law courses was further expanded to include courses in
the Landrum-Griffin Act, often denominated Internal Union 
Democracy, courses in alternative dispute resolution (of which collec­
tive bargaining and arbitration were only a part), and extensive and 
specialized offerings in areas such as OSHA and ERISA.
Commencing in the 1990s, what had been the basic labor law course 
began to be seen as a piece—and not a very significant piece—of a 
course in employment law. Presently, the notion that the study of “labor 
law” is the study of private sector labor relations governed by the NLRA 
is considered outdated. The clear message of today’s law school cur­
riculum is that traditional labor law—that is, the law governing the rela­
tionships of employers and unions representing employees in the 
private sector—has been marginalized.
A similar sea change has occurred in the practice of labor law spe­
cialists. In the 1960s, the labor law practitioner was generally involved 
in collective bargaining negotiations, representation and unfair labor 
practice cases before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 
grievance arbitration, and some duty of fair representation cases. The 
present-day employment law practitioner handles employment dis­
crimination cases of every sort (race, sex, disability, age, national ori­
gin), bankruptcy cases, pension and welfare benefit cases, worker 
health and safety cases, workplace privacy cases, unfair dismissal cases, 
workplace alcohol and drug abuse cases, duty of fair representation 
cases, plant closing cases, public sector cases of all varieties, and, inci­
dentally, an occasional representation or unfair labor practice case be­
fore the NLRB. As with the law school curriculum, the principal change 
in emphasis has been away from work associated with traditional col­
lective bargaining and unionized workers to a wider range of employ­
ment problems affecting organized and unorganized employees alike.
As stated, at the root of these changes in labor/employment law 
teaching and practice is the decline of private sector union organization 
and the increasing number of federal statutes affecting the rights of in­
dividuals in the workplace. Traditional labor law has been marginalized 
in law schools and law firms because labor unions have been marginal­
ized in the private sector of the economy.
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The hard data reflecting the decline in the union movement are 
sobering. Total union membership, as a percentage of the employed 
population as a whole, has steadily declined from a high of approxi­
mately 35 percent in 1954 to approximately 14.5 percent in 1996.6 
These figures actually disguise the extent of the erosion in union 
membership, because they include public sector employees. Three- 
fifths of the union members in the United States are in the private sec­
tor; union membership, as a percentage of private sector employment, 
has declined from a high of 38 percent in 1954 to its current low of 10 
percent.7 Even sympathetic commentators project that union mem­
bership will drop to an 8-10 percent share of the workforce by the 
year 2000.8
The effects of the decline in the union movement are magnified by 
the historic patterns of union organization in this country. Unions 
dominate in older industries, such as automotive, steel, clothing, and 
rubber, in older firms, and in older plants; the newer, more dynamic 
sectors of the economy are primarily non-union.9 Unions are not ef­
fectively organizing the fastest growing occupations,10 and are losing 
ground within traditional strongholds such as mining, construction, 
and trucking, all of which are not only diminishing in size but also 
developing significant non-union sectors.11
As one might expect from the evidence of their declining relative 
numbers, unions’ political influence—always relatively weak when 
compared to Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, for 
example—has deteriorated. Unions have been basically unsuccessful in 
defending or enhancing their own legal rights,12 or in passing strong 
general social welfare legislation in this country.13 In 1984, union sup­
port of the Democratic presidential candidate, Walter Mondale, was 
widely perceived to have hurt his candidacy.
The recent decline in the union movement cannot be dismissed as 
an aberration. The historical trend in union density in the private
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sector of the United States is “one of initial decline, rapid expansion in 
the 1930s and early 1940s, stability in the later 1940s and the 1930s, fol­
lowed by a long period of decline, which accelerated during the past 
decade [1980s].” 14 Unless the current situation is reversed, the 
influence of organized labor will continue to plunge.
The Causes of Decline in Organized Labor 
and the Role of Law
The major causes of organized labor s decline are inextricably inter­
twined. As we detail below, there were dramatic, structural changes in 
the international and national economies, which gave employers irre­
sistible incentives to eliminate or prevent unionization of the work­
force; employers were then able to accomplish these ends without 
serious impediment—and, indeed, sometimes with assistance—from 
the federal labor laws.
The Causes of Decline in the Union Movement
Traced to its origin, the decline of organized labor and collective bar­
gaining in the United States began with the demise of the economic 
environment that afforded employers in certain markets monopolistic 
or oligopolistic profits that organized labor, in turn, had pressed em­
ployers to share with their employees in the form of higher wages and 
other improved terms and conditions of employment. Thus, scholars 
opined that “stability in collective bargaining could be achieved only as 
long as unions were successful in organizing a sufficient part of the 
market and spread a standard wage across the market so as to take 
wages out of competition.” 15 In other words, collective bargaining 
took hold in the United States largely within core industries in which 
employers were earning relatively high profits, and in which unions or­
ganized virtually the entire industry so that employers were not con­
fronted by competitors with lower labor costs and greater flexibility.
During the 1970s and 1980s, employers in the core industries, such 
as steel, automotive, rubber, textile, and mining, which had had the 
run of the domestic economy for years, were subject to increasingly 
intense foreign competition. Similarly, as deregulation commenced, 
employers in heavily unionized, regulated industries, such as the air­
line, transportation, and communications industries, were confronted 
with new entrants in markets they had previously dominated. Two 
consequences of the internationalization and deregulation of the 
United States economy are critical here.
First, many employers in the core industrial sector of the 
economy—where unions traditionally had been strongest—did not 
survive their exposure to the international economy or deregulation. 
This sector lost jobs—and hence unions lost members—in record 
numbers.16
Second, and more importantly, surviving employers in core and 
regulated industries found their profit margins squeezed, and the his­
toric compromise reached with organized labor—higher wages, 
benefits,17 and strict work rules in return for a stable workplace—lost 
its appeal. Employers shifted their priorities away from labor peace to 
“controlling labor costs, streamlining work rules . . . ,  and promoting 
productivity.” 18 Employers became unwilling to pay the union wage 
premium19 or to tolerate restrictions on managerial flexibility (and 
thus productivity).20
The consequences of the squeeze placed on employers by the inter­
national and deregulated economy are well known:
Unionization has long been sufficiently high to impose costs on employer 
operations . . . ,  but never sufficiently encompassing, and coordinated with
political activities, to take those costs out o f com petition Students of
American industrial relations have often observed that United States em ­
ployers, in com parison to their counterparts in Europe, exhibit a striking 
and essentially unrelieved hostility to unions. This is the basic reason .2 1
In industries, firms, and plants where unions were able to maintain a 
presence, employers refused to engage in pattern or industry-wide 
bargaining, and instead insisted on contracts tailored to individual
firms, plants, and regions. In addition, employers forced many unions 
into concessionary bargaining in order to prevent or ameliorate 
significant workforce reductions.
Employers also sought, and often were able, to eliminate extant orga­
nization and to prevent new organization by use of a variety of tactics. 
Employers routinely considered the risk of unionization in deciding 
whether to add capacity to old facilities or to build new facilities, in de­
ciding where to locate their operations, and in deciding where to elimi­
nate excess capacity.22 In addition, more and more employers adopted 
human resource management policies (sometimes referred to as Quality 
of Work Life programs)23 designed to prevent unionization by provid­
ing locally competitive (albeit lower than union-negotiated) compensa­
tion, and instituting internal grievance procedures to ensure that 
employees’ views and complaints were heard and addressed. Finally, 
many employers eschewed cooperative labor-management relations and 
engaged in intense anti-union campaigns, utilizing tactics both legal 
and illegal.24
During the 1980s, employers’ resistance to unionization was tacitly 
encouraged by the Reagan and Bush administrations, which endorsed 
and enforced an ideology openly hostile to unions and collective bar­
gaining. President Reagan appointed as chair of the NLRB an individ­
ual who had publicly stated that “collective bargaining frequently 
means . . .  the destruction of individual freedom and the destruction 
of the marketplace.”25 President Reagan’s firm handling of the 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization strike, including his 
mass dismissal of striking air traffic controllers, made it very clear that 
the labor movement would not get a sympathetic ear in national polit­
ical affairs. “Not since the [pre-Great Depression] days of the 
American plan and company unionism [was] i t . . .  as socially or polit­
ically acceptable for U.S. management to embrace publicly a ‘union- 
free’ preference as it [was during the years of the Reagan 
administration].” 26 As one commentator explained:
The probability of being punished for using illegal union avoidance tac­
tics dim inished as the political and social environm ent became m ore tol-
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erant of open employer opposition to unions and as the legal system be­
came less effective in countering employer resistance to unions. The lack 
of any broadly shared public com m itm ent to labor as an im portant social 
and political movement further com pounded labor’s loss of influence in 
national politics .27
In sum, as the macroeconomic conditions that had made possible 
and profitable the historic compromise between labor and employers 
in the United States steadily eroded during the 1970s and 1980s, 
employers in both traditionally unionized and traditionally non- 
unionized sectors significantly stepped up their resistance to unions, 
and met with little political or social disapproval.
Our conclusion—that determined employer resistance, caused by 
significant competition in product markets, is a primary cause of the 
decline of organized labor—is strongly supported by an examination 
of the contrast between the successes of public sector organization and 
the failures of private organization in recent decades. Public sector em­
ployers are essentially monopolists; that is, they do not have competi­
tors in the traditional sense. And labor organizations meet significantly 
lower employer resistance to unionization in the public sector than in 
the private sector.28 That is not to say that public employers have no 
interest in controlling costs or maintaining flexibility, but rather that 
public employers are not subject to the same intense pressures regard­
ing profit maximization as are private sector employers.
The Role of Labor Law in the Decline of Organized Labor
What is particularly noteworthy about the decline in the union move­
ment in the private sector is the effect of law. Employer resistance to 
organized labor played a major role in the decline, but this resistance 
was fueled in significant ways by the N LRA—the labor law enacted to 
facilitate employee representation in the workplace. In other words, 
the NLRA served as a forceful instrument of employer resistance.29
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This is not surprising when one considers the historical effect of law 
on the labor movement in the United States.
There was no union movement to speak of in the United States be­
fore the turn of the twentieth century. Even after 1900, the incipient 
union movement was severely hampered by the application of anti­
trust laws to block organization, the use of injunctions to control 
unions’ economic actions, the enforcement of yellow-dog contracts, 
and the persistent “American dream” of individual achievement that 
implicitly rejected notions of the working class, union organization, 
and collective action.30 It was not until the late 1930s and 1940s that 
the industrial unions of the CIO finally emerged as a force, due to the 
advent of major industrial sectors, such as steel, auto, and transport, 
coupled with the crisis environment created by the Great Depression 
and World War II.
Despite the Roosevelt administrations basic indifference to orga­
nized labor,31 the political climate of the time, which strongly sup­
ported social welfare programs generally, was favorable to the 
enactment of legislation benefiting workers. The principal gains came 
with the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, severely limiting the judi­
ciary’s power to issue injunctions in labor disputes; the FLSA, setting 
minimum wages and maximum hours in the workplace; and the NLRA, 
recognizing employees’ rights to organize and bargain collectively.
In many respects, the labor movement initially benefited 
significantly from passage of the NLRA. The act established “majority 
rule” and “exclusive representation” in the workplace, ensuring that a 
union with majority support could require an employer to bargain 
about terms and conditions of employment only through the union. 
Individual rights were thus strictly limited in an organized workplace; 
unions had a duty of fair representation with respect to individual 
employees, but the duty was narrowly confined so as not to erode 
union authority in the negotiation or administration of collective bar­
gaining agreements.32 In addition, the Supreme Court construed the 
act to provide a legal framework for the enforcement of collective bar­
gaining agreements and arbitration awards and to preempt state regu­
lation of the bargaining parties’ relationship, both of which 
effectuated the act’s commitment to industrial self-government.33 
Finally, the NLRA established unfair labor practices (ULPs), prohibit­
ing certain employer conduct that had intimidated, coerced, or retali­
ated against union sympathizers, and created the NLRB to enforce the 
prohibitions against ULPs and the employer’s duty to bargain.
At the time of its enactment, the regime established by the NLRA 
was satisfactory to the labor movement. It allowed established unions 
to maintain their presence and even expand within the sectors of the 
economy in which they were already strong. In addition, it channeled 
the labor movement as a whole in the direction advocated by Samuel 
Gompers and, ultimately, the AFL-CIO—toward “pure and simple 
trade unionism,”34 which was narrowly focused on wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment and which eschewed broad 
political reform or participation in market or firm management.
But the transformation of the economy between the mid-1970s and 
mid-1990s has laid bare the NLRA’s inherent weaknesses and the danger 
that “pure and simple unionism” poses for the labor movement. Under 
present circumstances, the NLRA, as amended, severely limits unions in 
organizing efforts outside the sectors in which unions have been tradi­
tionally strong, permits a steady erosion of union strength even within 
such sectors, and stifles revitalization of the labor movement by pre­
venting unions from representing their members in the fora and on the 
issues most critical to modern workers.
For purposes of this analysis, it is useful to divide the act’s short­
comings into two categories: (1) provisions of the act that effectively 
limit organization outside of the (now few) economic sectors in which 
unions already have sufficient influence to take wages out of competi­
tion or to apply decisive economic pressure against employers, and 
(2) provisions of the act that independently ensure that whatever or­
ganization occurs is decentralized, fragmented, and narrowly focused 
on the work site and on limited issues related to the work site.
Limits on Union Organization. Under the NLRA, it commonly takes 
the NLRB at least eighteen months to issue an order adjudicating 
whether the act has been violated and, if so, to order a remedy 
Enforcement of any such order requires an appeal to a circuit court of 
appeals, a process rarely completed in less than a year. The NLRB’s de­
lays are often fatal to union representation. Delays in orders reinstating 
fired union activists, in orders requiring employers to cease and desist 
from unlawful campaign actions, and in orders requiring employers to 
bargain in good faith make the union appear ineffectual and make as­
sociation with the union appear risky; as time passes, turnover in the 
workforce can diminish union strength.
Furthermore, even if an NLRB order is ultimately enforced, the re­
lief ordered is “make-whole” —that is, it returns the parties to the posi­
tions they occupied before the violation occurred.35 Such a remedy 
has little deterrent value with respect to an employer seeking to 
stymie an organizing drive by firing union activists, or to eliminate a 
union by refusing to bargain a first collective bargaining agreement, 
or to break a strike by promising those who cross the picket line ex­
traordinary benefits.
Additionally, it is well documented that, under the NLRA, most 
unions will face great difficulties in seeking recognition as the exclu­
sive representative of a group of employees. Under NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1956), and its progeny,36 union organizers rarely 
have access to employees while on company property. Yet, a union 
must first organize 30 percent of what it believes is an appropriate bar­
gaining unit and then file a petition with the NLRB simply to obtain 
an election. There follows an election campaign, a period of time the 
employer may and often will extend in a variety of ways, because 
delay is to the employer’s benefit. For example, if the union’s proposed 
bargaining unit is challenged, the NLRB must hold a hearing and de­
termine the appropriate bargaining unit prior to the election; this 
alone can delay an election in excess of a month.37
The campaign period also provides the employer with the oppor­
tunity for legal and illegal conduct intended to discourage employees 
from electing representation. Threats, coercion, and inducements de­
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signed to prevent employees from voting to organize are illegal but 
oft-used employer tactics, which are extremely effective in preventing 
organization.38 “One careful study concluded that where employers 
campaigned lightly or not at all, unions won representation elections 
53-67% of the time; intense employer campaigning brought the suc­
cess rate down to the 22-34% range; and campaigning coupled with 
unfair labor practices reduced it further, to an almost vanishingly 
small 4-io% .” 39
Most significantly, the only remedy for an employee fired for union 
activity is reinstatement with back pay months and usually years later; 
most never return to their jobs (they have, of necessity, found other 
work during the long interim), and back pay awards to such employ­
ees average $2,000.40 This is a low cost, indeed, for the significant 
“persuasive” effect that discharge of union supporters during an orga­
nizational campaign may have.41 This is not merely a theoretical 
point, for a conservative estimate is that one in ten union supporters is 
discharged for his or her stance.42
If a union succeeds in obtaining recognition or certification as a bar­
gaining representative, it still faces the formidable task of bargaining a 
first collective agreement with the employer. As is well known, the em­
ployer has no obligation to agree to any specific terms or, indeed, to 
reach any agreement with the union; the employer must simply bargain 
in “good faith” —a vague standard that is breached only by a showing 
that the employer actively intended not to make any agreement.43 And, 
in any event, the only “punishment” faced by an employer who fails to 
bargain in good faith is an order from the NLRB requiring good faith 
bargaining—hardly an effective deterrent to an employer determined to 
resist organization.
Adding to the legal obstacles to organization and bargaining faced 
by unions are the substantial restrictions on a union’s use of economic 
force. First, a no-strike obligation will be implied from the presence of 
a grievance and arbitration clause in a union’s collective bargaining
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agreement.44 Second, even in connection with a lawful strike, which is 
considered protected activity under the NLRA, an employer may 
“permanently replace” striking workers;45 in periods of recession, this 
is an overwhelming weapon in the hands of an employer. Finally, 
other forms of economic action—such as sit-down strikes, concerted 
refusals to work overtime, in-plant demonstrations that disrupt pro­
duction, and slowdowns—are considered “unprotected.” Employees 
may be disciplined or discharged for engaging in such activities with­
out any legal recourse.
Narrow Bargaining Units and Limited Scope of Bargaining. Even 
leaving aside the limited effectiveness of the NLRA in protecting em­
ployees’ rights to act collectively, several aspects of the NLRA serve to 
maintain a decentralized and fragmented labor movement in which 
individual unions are relatively weak and have authority to represent 
workers only in connection with limited, work site-specific issues.
The significance of this is that the decisions most critical to today’s 
employees often are made at the level of the firm, the relevant market, 
or the national economy, and involve issues as to which unions have 
no authority to speak.
At the threshold, the coverage of the NLRA is limited. The act ex­
cludes from its protections managers and supervisors.46 These exclu­
sions not only limit organization, but also occasionally divide workers 
in the same workplace who may share a substantial community of in­
terest and prevent some workers from having any input with respect 
to managerial decisions of consequence to their working lives.47
Of greater significance, however, is that, in defining “appropriate” 
bargaining units, the NLRA strongly favors small units. This bias 
does, of course, assist a union in obtaining initial certification because 
it is easier and less expensive to amass support in a smaller unit. 
However, it also serves to fragment workers because bargaining units
are generally limited to employees in a single location operated by a 
particular employer, or sub-parts thereof. In fact, employees cannot 
routinely organize in concert with employees who work for other em­
ployers within the same industry, because unions cannot lawfully re­
quire employers to bargain jointly with other employers or through 
employer associations.48 These rules reinforce the widespread as­
sumption—among employers and unions alike—that employees of 
one department, plant, or employer share few concerns with employ­
ees of other departments, plants, or employers.
Finally, as to the scope of bargaining, the NLRA requires the parties 
to bargain only with respect to a limited range of issues—so-called 
mandatory subjects of bargaining, which are wages, hours, and terms 
and conditions of employment.49 As a result of this limitation, a 
union is unable to insist that an employer bargain about a number of 
significant issues—including multiemployer bargaining, capital in­
vestments, general firm structure and operations, plant closings, and 
virtually any issue extending beyond the bargaining unit involved.50
The differential treatment of mandatory and permissive subjects of 
bargaining also reinforces unions’ tendencies to organize small units 
and to concentrate in bargaining on narrow, unit-specific issues. And, 
as already stated, the fragmented organizational structure and limited 
focus of today’s unions, in turn, seriously impede their ability effec­
tively to represent employees on the issues of greatest moment in the 
workplace today—e.g., massive restructurings of employers, plant 
shutdowns, the introduction of new technology, the reorganization of 
work, inter-industry and firm job training and referral, and employee 
participation in the management of the enterprise.51
The act also tends to limit unions’ ability to use economic force so 
that the focal point of such activity is the job site. This legal limitation 
came in 1947, when the NLRA was amended to prohibit unions from 
engaging in “secondary” activity. This prohibition restricts union 
pressure on entities or individuals not directly involved in the labor 
dispute, if such secondary pressure is intended to put pressure on the 
primary employer.52
The Net Effect of Labor Law on the Union Movement. As Joel Rodgers 
has summarized:
The [NLRA] limits the range of initial organization, imposes enorm ous 
costs on unions during the recognition process, applies an almost purely 
procedural requirem ent on bargaining, limits even this requirem ent to a 
sharply restricted range of subject matters, restricts the use of economic 
weapons, is particularly restrictive of the use of weapons that entail cross- 
sectoral or cross-firm (or now perhaps, even intra-firm ) coordination 
am ong or within u n io n s___53
The NLRA as amended does not really promote employees’ rights to 
organize and act collectively, and it offers only limited and sometimes 
questionable protection for those who seek to exercise these rights. 
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that the act’s vision of the role of unions 
is too limited to serve as the basis for the emergence of revitalized labor 
organizations that can effectively represent modern employees.
The Relationship between Increased Protection of 
Individuals’ Rights and Union Decline
In recent years, the legislative and executive branches of the federal 
government have paid increased attention to the interests of employ­
ees in the workplace, promulgating a variety of laws and rules ad­
dressing discrimination, health and safety, pension rights, pregnancy 
leave, and the like. Thus, it is now sometimes asserted that the govern­
ment’s increased protection of the legal rights of individuals in the 
workplace has eliminated or significantly reduced the need for 
unions.54 We view this assertion to be quite without support.55
Employment law, by itself, often is not adequate to the task of pro­
tecting individual rights in the workplace for several reasons. 
Whatever the many virtues of the OSHA, ERISA, and FLSA, for ex­
ample, they must be enforced to be relevant, and a union presence 
often is critical in this regard. As Paul Weiler summarized with respect 
to OSHA:
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The consensus of research from the first decade of OSHA is that this legis­
lation has produced only a m odest reduction in the overall level of w ork­
place injuries. And a key variable that positively influences both the 
likelihood o f OSHA inspections and the size of penalties is whether the 
employees have been organized into a union with the experience and 
clout to insist on more effective adm inistration of the law for the benefit 
of its m em bers .56
Unions routinely fund litigation under ERISA to enforce pension and 
welfare benefits for both active workers and retirees. And large-scale 
FLSA violations—which generally involve an employer’s failure to pay 
minimum wage or overtime—often are brought to the attention of the 
Labor Department not by individuals but by unions. At bottom, legal 
rights are meaningful only if affected individuals have the knowledge, 
the technical expertise, and the resources to enforce those rights, and 
protection from the retaliation that may follow any attempt at en­
forcement. An individual who is part of a union is far more likely to 
have access to such assistance and protection.57
Moreover, the substantive protection afforded by the so-called em­
ployment laws in the United States is extremely limited. For example, 
ERISA sets certain standards for the funding and vesting of employee 
pensions, but does not require employers to provide or continue pen­
sion or health care benefits. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act re­
quires employers to treat pregnancy as they treat any other temporary 
disability, but does not require employers to grant leave for such dis­
abilities. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act re­
quires employers to give employees minimal notice of an impending 
plant closing, but does not require employers to provide severance 
pay, retraining, or any other substantive benefit.
In addition, the prospect for enactment in the United States of a 
comprehensive social safety net, including substantive employment
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rights akin to those present in Western Europe, for example, is slight. 
As Derek Bok has explained, legislators in the United States have 
a traditional aversion to substantive employment legislation.58 
Employment law does not now, and is not soon likely to, provide 
sufficient protection to obviate employees’ need to engage in collective 
activity for mutual aid and protection.59
It has also been argued that employment laws have contributed to 
the decline of unionization by means of a “substitution effect” —that 
is, that legislation has provided employees with benefits previously 
available only through unions, and that employees have therefore 
ceased to embrace unions. Most studies cast significant doubt on this 
hypothesis,60 as does the relatively stable and successful union move­
ment in Western Europe, where social programs far outstrip those of 
the United States.
Two additional explanations for union decline are often heard but, in 
our judgment, are secondary at best. First, some commentators have at­
tempted to explain the phenomenon of union decline by asserting that 
unions are institutions primarily servicing white males holding full­
time, blue-collar production jobs in the Northeast and Midwest, and 
that as the nature of workers and work has evolved, unions possess a 
shrinking potential membership pool. Female and minority workforce 
participation has increased dramatically; and the U.S. economy has lost 
numerous jobs in the manufacturing sector and gained jobs in the ser­
vices sector, the South and Southwest, and in part-time and temporary 
employment, traditionally non-union areas. But the data show that only 
one-quarter of the decline in union density can be explained by demo­
graphic and structural shifts in employment from manufacturing to 
services.61 And, indeed, several of the fastest-growing occupations 
strongly “resemble those where unions traditionally flourished.”62
Second, union detractors often blame internal union problems for 
the recent decline. Unions must accept some responsibility for their
plight. They appeared to neglect issues—such as pay equity and fam­
ily leave—critical to the commitment of female and minority workers 
who will constitute a large percentage of new workforce entrants in 
coming decades; these groups thus found outlets in other 
collectivities—the feminist and civil rights movements—which labor 
only half-heartedly embraced.63 In addition, unions were slow to shift 
their organizing efforts toward sectors of the economy not tradition­
ally organized, particularly service industries.64 But unions’ difficul­
ties in dealing with the demographic and structural changes in the 
workforce cannot be laid only at their door; unions’ failure to organize 
effectively is inescapably tied to the legal environment and the likeli­
hood that a determined employer will successfully resist unionization.
In short, we are unpersuaded that either the limited package of 
substantive employment laws protecting certain legal rights of indi­
vidual employees or the other factors discussed in this section have 
contributed in any significant way to the current malaise in the U.S. 
union movement.
What Next?
As we suggested at the outset, union organization and collective bar­
gaining are not ends in themselves. The only reason to pause over the 
decline of the union movement in the private sector and to reflect on 
the effects of labor and employment laws is that these matters maybe 
inexorably tied to our goals in pursuit of a better society. As previ­
ously stated, a principal premise of this essay is that “strong and effec­
tive institutions for worker representation are essential not only to a 
democratic society but also to the nation’s economic progress.” 65
Nonetheless, in considering these issues, we recognize that unions 
are not necessarily worthwhile institutions if their policies and prac­
tices are rigidly short-sighted and cannot adjust to changing eco­
nomic markets, changing technology, and the changing demographics 
and needs of the workforce. Likewise, even if we are correct in assum­
ing that workers should have a meaningful voice in establishing the 
policies and benefits affecting their lives at work, it does not follow
that this can or should be done only through traditional forms of col­
lective bargaining.
In thinking about the future, there is an apparent consensus in the 
United States that we should aim to reduce our national debt, establish 
a strong competitive base in international markets, and achieve some­
thing approaching full employment. We also seek to afford full and 
fair opportunities to all workers, both to gain employment and to pur­
sue advancements in the job market. In our view, in order to achieve 
these goals, government and business must commit themselves to a 
strategy that will entice to this country capital investment in facilities 
for production. The inducements to achieve this end must include the 
promise of a highly skilled, highly educated labor force capable of the 
production of technologically advanced goods and services.
Those advanced industrial nations that have been m ost successful in inter­
national markets are prom oting high-quality goods and services requiring 
flexible methods of organizing both production and work. For instance, the 
last 15 years have seen a celebration of the so-called “small states” of 
Western Europe (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Denmark), which are highly de­
pendent on exports and therefore have no choice but to rely on highly 
skilled, high-wage labor producing high labor-value-added goods and ser­
vices. This choice uses the quality of labor input as a powerful comparative 
advantage in international m arkets.66
We also believe that labor must be treated as a partner in pursuit of 
this strategy:
The evidence from abroad shows that m ost often extensive worker repre­
sentation and labor participation in strategic m anagerial decision m aking 
and in organizing skills and training program s (i.e., internal labor m ar­
kets) and managing flexibility in the allocation of hum an resources across 
firms and industries (i.e., external labor markets) play im portant roles in 
sustaining these successful economic strategies.67
It only stands to reason that a significant worker “voice” is neces­
sary for the United States economy to transform itself as described 
above. The postindustrial economy requires nothing less than the
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gradual transformation of the American worker; postindustrial tech­
nology demands significantly increased involvement, flexibility, and 
commitment from employees. It is doubtful that workers will accept 
the kinds of revolutionary reforms necessary in the postindustrial 
economy unless they participate in the major strategic decisions shap­
ing the economy and, more specifically, their workplaces. And, in any 
event, there is now a recognition by enlightened members of the busi­
ness community that it is foolhardy for government and/or business 
willy-nilly to implement major changes in the production process 
without consulting those who know the most about that process— 
employees.68
With this said, we face at least two very difficult questions: How can 
the employee participation essential to the reformation of our na­
tional economy best be achieved? And, more specifically, what role 
can the law play in bringing it about? That is, what are the legitimate 
interests of postindustrial employees and what should labor organiza­
tions seeking to represent those interests be legally authorized to do?
The modern American employee is prototypically a low-wage, low- 
skill employee in a traditional service industry, or a high-wage, high- 
skill employee in a knowledge- or information-based industry. 
Although American unions may continue to represent such workers on 
traditional matters such as wages and to prevent the arbitrary imposi­
tion of workplace rules and discipline, they must do more to survive. 
The international economy is such that unions generally will not be 
able to negotiate a significant wage differential for their members; and 
protection from discharge without just cause may soon be available to 
all employees. Thus, unions must focus on more than just “bread and 
butter” issues, must operate in fora beyond the traditional “appropriate 
units” for collective bargaining, and must speak on behalf of all workers 
(whether or not represented in traditional collective bargaining), or be 
replaced by associations that can meet the urgent representational 
needs of modern workers. We offer the following suggestions.
174 H a r r y  T. E d w a r d s  a n d  V ir g in ia  A. S e it z
First, with respect to both low-skill and high-skill employees, dislo­
cation is a major problem. This will remain true as our national econ­
omy continues to adjust to international competition, deregulation, 
and new technologies. At present when a union member loses his or 
her job, the relationship between union and worker more often than 
not terminates, because the union is legally designated to represent 
only employees in a bargaining unit at a particular work site. To effec­
tively represent members of the present workforce, unions must forge 
a connection with their members that goes beyond the employee’s job 
and encompasses his or her career.69 Thus, unions must not only 
serve the needs of members who hold jobs in organized workplaces, 
but also offer membership and services to individuals who are seeking 
work or who are working in an unorganized workplace.
More concretely, the current work site-based structure for union 
membership simply does not serve the representational needs of 
workers in low-wage, low-skill service jobs. Workers in these jobs ex­
perience a high rate of turnover and often work in temporary or part- 
time jobs, but also have a long-term tendency to hold the same type of 
job based in a confined geographical area. What such employees re­
quire is a union organized “geographically along loose occupational 
lines” —a modern hiring hall or job referral and training service 
through which employees can move in and out of similar jobs offering 
uniform wages, and portable seniority, pension credits, and associated 
benefits.70
The needs of high-wage, high-skill knowledge workers are simi­
larly ill-met by the current work site-based structure for union mem­
bership. The hallmarks of new, high-technology companies are their 
srriall size, their often short lives, and the skill and flexibility required 
of the workforce. High-wage, high-skill employees need access to 
comprehensive, updated information about the external job market 
and about educational and training opportunities. There is no reason 
that unions—perhaps unions that evolve from professional standards 
organizations—should not fulfill these needs.
There are many other ways in which unions might effectively assist 
members presently employed in unorganized workplaces. For exam­
ple, in a second trilogy relating to arbitration,71 the Supreme Court 
has expanded judicial deference to arbitration beyond the context of 
collectively bargained arbitration procedures to include arbitration of 
any disputes arising in the employer-employee relationship, including 
claims of statutory violations.72 Unions can offer employees expert 
representation, including access to legal services, in the context of such 
arbitrations. And unions could provide similar services to employees 
seeking to enforce individual legal rights under some of the employ­
ment laws discussed above.
Finally, all postindustrial employees need an effective representa­
tive at the firm, industry, and national level where strategic decisions 
affecting their careers take place. In the latter context, unions should 
be the “leading voice in advocating skills intensive competitive strate­
gies at the firm and industry levels and a human capital intensive eco­
nomic policy at the local, state and national policy-making levels.” 73 
To effectively perform this role, unions must act as one, moving be­
yond the straitjacket of traditional collective bargaining and the frag­
mented union movement it fosters.
Thus, unions must transform themselves so that they can take on 
the above-described role of representative and advocate of individual 
employees not simply when they are members of bargaining units at 
particular work sites, but also in the economy as a whole. This trans­
formation will require wholesale changes in the union movement, and 
a great deal of it can occur without any changes in the labor laws. But 
it would be naive to assume that there can be a fully effective transfor­
mation absent some legislative revisions to the NLRA.
At its core, the NLRA is overly rigid in its prescriptions, unneces­
sarily cumbersome in its scheme of enforcement, and patently unfair 
in the balance that it strikes on certain issues. Worst of all, the act 
tends to promote harsh confrontation, not consultation or delibera­
tion, between management and labor. The Supreme Court once said, 
“ The basic theme of the Act was that through collective bargaining 
the passions, arguments, and struggles of prior years would be chan­
neled into constructive, open discussions leading, it was hoped, to 
mutual agreement.” 74 With the benefit of hindsight, we now recognize 
that this is a fanciful notion. The problem is that although the act pur­
ports to legalize employee representation and collective bargaining, 
there are too many procedural strictures and substantive limitations 
in the way of “constructive” relationships.
For example, as already noted, the NLRA as construed distin­
guishes between so-called mandatory and permissive subjects of bar­
gaining. Thus, the NLRB and the courts often are faced with patently 
absurd questions regarding the necessity of bargaining over matters 
such as merit pay,75 pension benefits for retired workers,76 plant clos­
ings and relocations,77 and the like, all of which raise issues of extra­
ordinary importance and concern to both management and labor. 
There is no way that such issues can be “removed” from the minds of 
the parties at the bargaining table, yet the NLRA purports to do so.
The net result of the mandatory/permissive dichotomy often is 
prolonged confrontation and litigation over what is and is not bar- 
gainable, or over whether a strike with respect to such issues is illegal 
and thus unprotected, or over whether an employer must negotiate to 
“ impasse” before acting with respect to the disputed issues. The act 
thus promotes adjudication over issues that ought to be left exclu­
sively to negotiations between the bargaining parties. And once the 
battle is engaged it often will consume years in litigation, and, in the 
end, the judgment of the board or court usually does not come close 
to resolving the real dispute between the parties. If the union wins, the 
remedy may be too little and too late; and if management wins, it still 
may face an angry workforce that has been denied any opportunity to 
discuss a matter of grave and mutual concern to the parties. This 
makes no sense. Thus, in our view, the distinction between mandatory 
and permissive subjects of bargaining—which artificially confines 
bargaining—should be eliminated.
Furthermore, unions should be permitted to organize in units that 
actually reflect workers’ interests and that correspond to relevant divi­
sions within the economy; the fragmentation of bargaining units now 
seen in the private sector is pointless and counterproductive. Indeed,
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in the public sector, the general practice has been to certify unions 
only in the broadest appropriate units; fragmented units often are 
prohibited. If this idea was followed in the private sector, this would 
allow for bargaining units “geographically along loose occupational 
lines,” and also more multiemployer units organized either by indus­
try, occupation, or skill level. This would be a salutary development^ 
because unions should be free to insist on bargaining units that foster 
the effective representation of employees.
Initially, a move from narrow units might pose problems for unions 
in organization campaigns, for it is easier to organize on a work site 
than in units organized by industry or occupation. But this problem 
would be minimized if the board was required to hold representation 
elections immediately upon any showing of interest by a union in any 
reasonably configured unit. The act should eliminate the board’s 30 
percent rule, ban “hearings” on certification petitions, and eliminate 
the opportunity for election campaigns by either side. The question of 
representation should be decided quickly, yes or no, and then the par­
ties should get on with bargaining if the union wins.
With respect to the obligation to bargain, the NLRB and the courts 
ought to be barred from adjudicating any issues concerning good faith 
bargaining or the permissible subjects of bargaining. Litigation in these 
areas has mostly served to distract the parties from their principal mis­
sion of reaching agreement. If the parties cannot agree, they should be 
left to their economic weapons. Unions should be allowed to strike and 
employers should be allowed to lock out and take unilateral action (even 
absent an “impasse” ).
Our assumption is that if bargaining is left wide open, the parties 
will more often than not successfully air their grievances at the bar­
gaining table. We also assume that, if bargaining is broad-based (in 
nonfragmented units) and if the parties have full resort to a reason­
able panoply of economic weapons, the stakes usually will be too high 
for either side to press for impasse. But, in the event of a breakdown in 
negotiations, the parties should be allowed to engage in a “fair fight.”
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Thus, we disagree with the judicial interpretation of the NLRA that 
authorizes employers to permanently replace strikers. The rule allowing 
such action should be eliminated. It should be acknowledged that an 
employer can continue to operate and to hire workers for that purpose, 
but the immediate permanent replacement of those who simply exer­
cise their right to act collectively puts too high a price on the collective 
action that the NLRA was designed to encourage.78 Likewise, the 
NLRA’s prohibition on secondary activity—which allows workers to act 
in concert only on behalf of workers employed by a single employer at a 
single work site, and not on behalf of all workers with whom they share 
a common interest—should be eliminated. If employers are allowed to 
temporarily replace strikers and take unilateral action even without an 
impasse, as we suggest, unions should be free to broadcast their mes­
sage and seek and obtain support within the community as they see fit.
Finally, if the transformation that we envision is to occur, represen­
tatives from government, management, and labor must have an 
official forum in which to meet and confer outside of the context of 
traditional collective bargaining. Because there is no parliamentary 
system of government in the United States, labors access to national 
policymakers is limited to that of lobbyists. With respect to certain is­
sues, however, labor should be at the table with government and busi­
ness officials to address matters of national priority, such as 
international competition, the balance of trade, capital investment, 
business relocations, workforce training, unemployment, and the na­
tional debt. If labor is allowed to give real input with respect to such 
issues—even in nonbinding deliberations—its positions in this and 
other contexts probably will be less parochial, its perspectives are 
bound to be useful, and its cooperation is more likely to be forthcom­
ing in future efforts to promote economic progress.
Conclusion
We have outlined an ambitious vision of labor law reform that plainly 
cannot come about without a consensus among government, business, 
and labor that a major overhaul of our national economic policy is re­
quired, and that a critical component of any such overhaul is the full and 
effective participation of representatives of the workforce. Obviously, we 
see merit in the ideas that we have outlined, many of which are not orig­
inal with us. We recognize, however, that certain of these proposals may 
be unobtainable due to political realities. Nonetheless, we leave this ex­
ercise sure of two things: first, labor law reform is needed and it is essen­
tial to economic progress; second, the work of the ILR School at Cornell 
University will be more important than ever in the years to come as 
society continues to search for answers to the problems outlined in this 
and other essays in this volume. ■
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